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Lessons from 139 YC AI startups (S23)
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minophenThis week

Lessons from 139 YC AI startups (S23)

YC's Demo Day was last week, and with it comes another deluge of AI companies. A record-breaking 139 startups were in some way related to AI or ML - up from 112 in the last batch. Here are 5 of my biggest takeaways: AI is (still) eating the world. It's remarkable how diverse the industries are - over two dozen verticals were represented, from materials science to social media to security. However, the top four categories were: AI Ops: Tooling and platforms to help companies deploy working AI models. We'll discuss more below, but AI Ops has become a huge category, primarily focused on LLMs and taming them for production use cases. Developer Tools: Apps, plugins, and SDKs making it easier to write code. There were plenty of examples of integrating third-party data, auto-generating code/tests, and working with agents/chatbots to build and debug code. Healthcare + Biotech: It seems like healthcare has a lot of room for automation, with companies working on note-taking, billing, training, and prescribing. And on the biotech side, there are some seriously cool companies building autonomous surgery robots and at-home cancer detection. Finance + Payments: Startups targeting banks, fintechs, and compliance departments. This was a wide range of companies, from automated collections to AI due diligence to "Copilot for bankers." Those four areas covered over half of the startups. The first two make sense: YC has always filtered for technical founders, and many are using AI to do what they know - improve the software developer workflow. But it's interesting to see healthcare and finance not far behind. Previously, I wrote: Large enterprises, healthcare, and government are not going to send sensitive data to OpenAI. This leaves a gap for startups to build on-premise, compliant \[LLMs\] for these verticals. And we're now seeing exactly that - LLMs focused on healthcare and finance and AI Ops companies targeting on-prem use cases. It also helps that one of the major selling points of generative AI right now is cost-cutting - an enticing use case for healthcare and finance. Copilots are king. In the last batch, a lot of startups positioned themselves as "ChatGPT for X," with a consumer focus. It seems the current trend, though, is "Copilot for X" - B2B AI assistants to help you do everything from KYC checks to corporate event planning to chip design to negotiate contracts. Nearly two dozen companies were working on some sort of artificial companion for businesses - and a couple for consumers. It's more evidence for the argument that AI will not outright replace workers - instead, existing workers will collaborate with AI to be more productive. And as AI becomes more mainstream, this trend of making specialized tools for specific industries or tasks will only grow. That being said - a Bing-style AI that lives in a sidebar and is only accessible via chat probably isn't the most useful form factor for AI. But until OpenAI, Microsoft, and Google change their approach (or until another company steps up), we'll probably see many more Copilots. AI Ops is becoming a key sector. "AI Ops" has been a term for only a few years. "LLM Ops" has existed for barely a year. And yet, so many companies are focused on training, fine-tuning, deploying, hosting, and post-processing LLMs it's quickly becoming a critical piece of the AI space. It's a vast industry that's sprung up seemingly overnight, and it was pretty interesting to see some of the problems being solved at the bleeding edge. For example: Adding context to language models with as few as ten samples. Pausing and moving training runs in real-time. Managing training data ownership and permissions. Faster vector databases. Fine-tuning models with synthetic data. But as much ~~hype~~ enthusiasm and opportunity as there might be, the size of the AI Ops space also shows how much work is needed to really productionalize LLMs and other models. There are still many open questions about reliability, privacy, observability, usability, and safety when it comes to using LLMs in the wild. Who owns the model? Does it matter? Nine months ago, anyone building an LLM company was doing one of three things: Training their own model from scratch. Fine-tuning a version of GPT-3. Building a wrapper around ChatGPT. Thanks to Meta, the open-source community, and the legions of competitors trying to catch up to OpenAI, there are now dozens of ways to integrate LLMs. However, I found it interesting how few B2B companies mentioned whether or not they trained their own model. If I had to guess, I'd say many are using ChatGPT or a fine-tuned version of Llama 2. But it raises an interesting question - if the AI provides value, does it matter if it's "just" ChatGPT behind the scenes? And once ChatGPT becomes fine-tuneable, when (if ever) will startups decide to ditch OpenAI and use their own model instead? "AI" isn't a silver bullet. At the end of the day, perhaps the biggest lesson is that "AI" isn't a magical cure-all - you still need to build a defensible company. At the beginning of the post-ChatGPT hype wave, it seemed like you just had to say "we're adding AI" to raise your next round or boost your stock price. But competition is extremely fierce. Even within this batch, there were multiple companies with nearly identical pitches, including: Solving customer support tickets. Negotiating sales contracts. Writing drafts of legal documents. Building no-code LLM workflows. On-prem LLM deployment. Automating trust and safety moderation. As it turns out, AI can be a competitive advantage, but it can't make up for a bad business. The most interesting (and likely valuable) companies are the ones that take boring industries and find non-obvious use cases for AI. In those cases, the key is having a team that can effectively distribute a product to users, with or without AI. Where we’re headed I'll be honest - 139 companies is a lot. In reviewing them all, there were points where it just felt completely overwhelming. But after taking a step back, seeing them all together paints an incredibly vivid picture of the current AI landscape: one that is diverse, rapidly evolving, and increasingly integrated into professional and personal tasks. These startups aren't just building AI for the sake of technology or academic research, but are trying to address real-world problems. Technology is always a double-edged sword - and some of the startups felt a little too dystopian for my taste - but I'm still hopeful about AI's ability to improve productivity and the human experience.

How me and my team made 15+ apps and not made a single sale in 2023
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MichaelbetterecycleThis week

How me and my team made 15+ apps and not made a single sale in 2023

Hey, my name is Michael, I am in Auckland NZ. This year was the official beginning of my adult life. I graduated from university and started a full-time job. I’ve also really dug into indiehacking/bootstrapping and started 15 projects (and it will be at least 17 before the year ends). I think I’ve learned a lot but I consciously repeated mistakes. Upto (Nov) Discord Statuses + Your Location + Facebook Poke https://preview.redd.it/4nqt7tp2tf5c1.png?width=572&format=png&auto=webp&s=b0223484bc54b45b5c65e0b1afd0dc52f9c02ad1 This was the end of uni, I often messaged (and got messaged) requests of status and location to (and from my) friends. I thought, what if we make a social app that’s super basic and all it does is show you where your friends are? To differentiate from snap maps and others we wanted something with more privacy where you select the location. However, never finished the codebase or launched it. This is because I slowly started to realize that B2C (especially social networks) are way too hard to make into an actual business and the story with Fistbump would repeat itself. However, this decision not to launch it almost launched a curse on our team. From that point, we permitted ourselves to abandon projects even before launching. Lessons: Don’t do social networks if your goal is 10k MRR ASAP. If you build something to 90% competition ship it or you will think it’s okay to abandon projects Insight Bites (Nov) Youtube Summarizer Extension ​ https://preview.redd.it/h6drqej4tf5c1.jpg?width=800&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=0f211456c390ac06f4fcb54aa51f9d50b0826658 Right after Upto, we started ideating and conveniently the biggest revolution in the recent history of tech was released → GPT. We instantly began ideating. The first problem we chose to use AI for is to summarize YouTube videos. Comical. Nevertheless, I am convinced we have had the best UX because you could right-click on a video to get a slideshow of insights instead of how everyone else did it. We dropped it because there was too much competition and unit economics didn’t work out (and it was a B2C). PodPigeon (Dec) Podcast → Tweet Threads https://preview.redd.it/0ukge245tf5c1.png?width=2498&format=png&auto=webp&s=23303e1cab330578a3d25cd688fa67aa3b97fb60 Then we thought, to make unit economics work we need to make this worthwhile for podcasters. This is when I got into Twitter and started seeing people summarize podcasts. Then I thought, what if we make something that converts a podcast into tweets? This was probably one of the most important projects because it connected me with Jason and Jonaed, both of whom I regularly stay in contact with and are my go-to experts on ideas related to content creation. Jonaed was even willing to buy Podpigeon and was using it on his own time. However, the unit economics still didn’t work out (and we got excited about other things). Furthermore, we got scared of the competition because I found 1 - 2 other people who did similar things poorly. This was probably the biggest mistake we’ve made. Very similar projects made 10k MRR and more, launching later than we did. We didn’t have a coherent product vision, we didn’t understand the customer well enough, and we had a bad outlook on competition and a myriad of other things. Lessons: I already made another post about the importance of outlook on competition. Do not quit just because there are competitors or just because you can’t be 10x better. Indiehackers and Bootstrappers (or even startups) need to differentiate in the market, which can be via product (UX/UI), distribution, or both. Asking Ace Intro.co + Crowdsharing ​ https://preview.redd.it/0hu2tt16tf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=3d397568ef2331e78198d64fafc1a701a3e75999 As I got into Twitter, I wanted to chat with some people I saw there. However, they were really expensive. I thought, what if we made some kind of crowdfunding service for other entrepreneurs to get a private lecture from their idols? It seemed to make a lot of sense on paper. It was solving a problem (validated via the fact that Intro.co is a thing and making things cheaper and accessible is a solid ground to stand on), we understood the market (or so we thought), and it could monetize relatively quickly. However, after 1-2 posts on Reddit and Indiehackers, we quickly learned three things. Firstly, no one cares. Secondly, even if they do, they think they can get the same information for free online. Thirdly, the reasons before are bad because for the first point → we barely talked to people, and for the second people → we barely talked to the wrong people. However, at least we didn’t code anything this time and tried to validate via a landing page. Lessons Don’t give up after 1 Redditor says “I don’t need this” Don’t be scared to choose successful people as your audience. Clarito Journaling with AI analyzer https://preview.redd.it/8ria2wq6tf5c1.jpg?width=1108&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=586ec28ae75003d9f71b4af2520b748d53dd2854 Clarito is a classic problem all amateur entrepreneurs have. It’s where you lie to yourself that you have a real problem and therefore is validated but when your team asks you how much you would pay you say I guess you will pay, maybe, like 5 bucks a month…? Turns out, you’d have to pay me to use our own product lol. We sent it off to a few friends and posted on some forums, but never really got anything tangible and decided to move away. Honestly, a lot of it is us in our own heads. We say the market is too saturated, it’ll be hard to monetize, it’s B2C, etc. Lessons: You use the Mom Test on other people. You have to do it yourself as well. However, recognizing that the Mom Test requires a lot of creativity in its investigation because knowing what questions to ask can determine the outcome of the validation. I asked myself “Do I journal” but I didn’t ask myself “How often do I want GPT to chyme in on my reflections”. Which was practically never. That being said I think with the right audience and distribution, this product can work. I just don’t know (let alone care) about the audience that much (and I thought I was one of them)/ Horns & Claw Scrapes financial news texts you whether you should buy/sell the stock (news sentiment analysis) ​ https://preview.redd.it/gvfxdgc7tf5c1.jpg?width=1287&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=63977bbc33fe74147b1f72913cefee4a9ebec9c2 This one we didn’t even bother launching. Probably something internal in the team and also seemed too good to be true (because if this works, doesn’t that just make us ultra-rich fast?). I saw a similar tool making 10k MRR so I guess I was wrong. Lessons: This one was pretty much just us getting into our heads. I declared that without an audience it would be impossible to ship this product and we needed to start a YouTube channel. Lol, and we did. And we couldn’t even film for 1 minute. I made bold statements like “We will commit to this for at least 1 year no matter what”. Learnery Make courses about any subject https://preview.redd.it/1nw6z448tf5c1.jpg?width=1112&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=f2c73e8af23b0a6c3747a81e785960d4004feb48 This is probably the most “successful” project we’ve made. It grew from a couple of dozen to a couple of hundred users. It has 11 buy events for $9.99 LTD (we couldn’t be bothered connecting Stripe because we thought no one would buy it anyway). However what got us discouraged from seriously pursuing it more is, that this has very low defensibility, “Why wouldn’t someone just use chatGPT?” and it’s B2C so it’s hard to monetize. I used it myself for a month or so but then stopped. I don’t think it’s the app, I think the act of learning a concept from scratch isn’t something you do constantly in the way Learnery delivers it (ie course). I saw a bunch of similar apps that look like Ass make like 10k MRR. Lessons: Don’t do B2C, or if you do, do it properly Don’t just Mixpanel the buy button, connect your Stripe otherwise, it doesn’t feel real and you won’t get momentum. I doubt anyone (even me) will make this mistake again. I live in my GPT bubble where I make assumptions that everyone uses GPT the same way and as much as I do. In reality, the argument that this has low defensibility against GPT is invalid. Platforms that deliver a differentiated UX from ChatGPT to audiences who are not tightly integrated into the habit of using ChatGPT (which is like - everyone except for SOME tech evangelists). CuriosityFM Make podcasts about any subject https://preview.redd.it/zmosrcp8tf5c1.jpg?width=638&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=d04ddffabef9050050b0d87939273cc96a8637dc This was our attempt at making Learnery more unique and more differentiated from chatGPT. We never really launched it. The unit economics didn’t work out and it was actually pretty boring to listen to, I don’t think I even fully listened to one 15-minute episode. I think this wasn’t that bad, it taught us more about ElevenLabs and voice AI. It took us maybe only 2-3 days to build so I think building to learn a new groundbreaking technology is fine. SleepyTale Make children’s bedtime stories https://preview.redd.it/14ue9nm9tf5c1.jpg?width=807&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=267e18ec6f9270e6d1d11564b38136fa524966a1 My 8-year-old sister gave me that idea. She was too scared of making tea and I was curious about how she’d react if she heard a bedtime story about that exact scenario with the moral that I wanted her to absorb (which is that you shouldn’t be scared to try new things ie stop asking me to make your tea and do it yourself, it’s not that hard. You could say I went full Goebbels on her). Zane messaged a bunch of parents on Facebook but no one really cared. We showed this to one Lady at the place we worked from at Uni and she was impressed and wanted to show it to her kids but we already turned off our ElevenLabs subscription. Lessons: However, the truth behind this is beyond just “you need to be able to distribute”. It’s that you have to care about the audience. I don’t particularly want to build products for kids and parents. I am far away from that audience because I am neither a kid anymore nor going to be a parent anytime soon, and my sister still asked me to make her tea so the story didn’t work. I think it’s important to ask yourself whether you care about the audience. The way you answer that even when you are in full bias mode is, do you engage with them? Are you interested in what’s happening in their communities? Are you friends with them? Etc. User Survey Analyzer Big User Survey → GPT → Insights Report Me and my coworker were chatting about AI when he asked me to help him analyze a massive survey for him. I thought that was some pretty decent validation. Someone in an actual company asking for help. Lessons Market research is important but moving fast is also important. Ie building momentum. Also don’t revolve around 1 user. This has been a problem in multiple projects. Finding as many users as possible in the beginning to talk to is key. Otherwise, you are just waiting for 1 person to get back to you. AutoI18N Automated Internationalization of the codebase for webapps This one I might still do. It’s hard to find a solid distribution strategy. However, the idea came from me having to do it at my day job. It seems a solid problem. I’d say it’s validated and has some good players already. The key will be differentiation via the simplicity of UX and distribution (which means a slightly different audience). In the backlog for now because I don’t care about the problem or the audience that much. Documate - Part 1 Converts complex PDFs into Excel https://preview.redd.it/8b45k9katf5c1.jpg?width=1344&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=57324b8720eb22782e28794d2db674b073193995 My mom needed to convert a catalog of furniture into an inventory which took her 3 full days of data entry. I automated it for her and thought this could have a big impact but there was no distribution because there was no ICP. We tried to find the ideal customers by talking to a bunch of different demographics but I flew to Kazakhstan for a holiday and so this kind of fizzled out. I am not writing this blog post linearity, this is my 2nd hour and I am tired and don’t want to finish this later so I don’t even know what lessons I learned. Figmatic Marketplace of high-quality Figma mockups of real apps https://preview.redd.it/h13yv45btf5c1.jpg?width=873&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=aaa2896aeac2f22e9b7d9eed98c28bb8a2d2cdf1 This was a collab between me and my friend Alex. It was the classic Clarito where we both thought we had this problem and would pay to fix it. In reality, this is a vitamin. Neither I, nor I doubt Alex have thought of this as soon as we bought the domain. We posted it on Gumroad, sent it to a bunch of forums, and called it a day. Same issue as almost all the other ones. No distribution strategy. However, apps like Mobin show us that this concept is indeed profitable but it takes time. It needs SEO. It needs a community. None of those things, me and Alex had or was interested in. However shortly after HTML → Figma came out and it’s the best plugin. Maybe that should’ve been the idea. Podcast → Course Turns Podcaster’s episodes into a course This one I got baited by Jason :P I described to him the idea of repurposing his content for a course. He told me this was epic and he would pay. Then after I sent him the demo, he never checked it out. Anyhow during the development, we realized that doesn’t actually work because A podcast doesn’t have the correct format for the course, the most you can extract are concepts and ideas, seldom explanations. Most creators want video-based courses to be hosted on Kajabi or Udemy Another lesson is that when you pitch something to a user, what you articulate is a platform or a process, they imagine an outcome. However, the end result of your platform can be a very different outcome to what they had in mind and there is even a chance that what they want is not possible. You need to understand really well what the outcome looks like before you design the process. This is a classic problem where we thought of the solution before the problem. Yes, the problem exists. Podcasters want to make courses. However, if you really understand what they want, you can see how repurposing a podcast isn’t the best way to get there. However I only really spoke to 1-2 podcasters about this so making conclusions is dangerous for this can just be another asking ace mistake with the Redditor. Documate Part 2 Same concept as before but now I want to run some ads. We’ll see what happens. https://preview.redd.it/xb3npj0ctf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=3cd4884a29fd11d870d010a2677b585551c49193 In conclusion https://preview.redd.it/2zrldc9dtf5c1.jpg?width=1840&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=2b3105073e752ad41c23f205dbd1ea046c1da7ff It doesn’t actually matter that much whether you choose to do a B2C, or a social network or focus on growing your audience. All of these can make you successful. What’s important is that you choose. If I had to summarize my 2023 in one word it’s indecision. Most of these projects succeeded for other people, nothing was as fundamentally wrong about them as I proclaimed. In reality that itself was an excuse. New ideas seduce, and it is a form of discipline to commit to a single project for a respectful amount of time. https://preview.redd.it/zy9a2vzdtf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=901c621227bba0feb4efdb39142f66ab2ebb86fe Distribution is not just posting on Indiehackers and Reddit. It’s an actual strategy and you should think of it as soon as you think of the idea, even before the Figma designs. I like how Denis Shatalin taught me. You have to build a pipeline. That means a reliable way to get leads, launch campaigns at them, close deals, learn from them, and optimize. Whenever I get an idea now I always try to ask myself “Where can I find 1000s leads in one day?” If there is no good answer, this is not a good project to do now. ​ https://preview.redd.it/2boh3fpetf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=1c0d5d7b000716fcbbb00cbad495e8b61e25be66 Talk to users before doing anything. Jumping on designing and coding to make your idea a reality is a satisfying activity in the short term. Especially for me, I like to create for the sake of creation. However, it is so important to understand the market, understand the audience, understand the distribution. There are a lot of things to understand before coding. https://preview.redd.it/lv8tt96ftf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=6c8735aa6ad795f216ff9ddfa2341712e8277724 Get out of your own head. The real reason we dropped so many projects is that we got into our own heads. We let the negative thoughts creep in and kill all the optimism. I am really good at coming up with excuses to start a project. However, I am equally as good at coming up with reasons to kill a project. And so you have this yin and yang of starting and stopping. Building momentum and not burning out. I can say with certainty my team ran out of juice this year. We lost momentum so many times we got burnt out towards the end. Realizing that the project itself has momentum is important. User feedback and sales bring momentum. Building also creates momentum but unless it is matched with an equal force of impact, it can stomp the project down. That is why so many of our projects died quickly after we launched. The smarter approach is to do things that have a low investment of momentum (like talking to users) but result in high impact (sales or feedback). Yes, that means the project can get invalidated which makes it more short-lived than if we built it first, but it preserves team life energy. At the end of 2023 here is a single sentence I am making about how I think one becomes a successful indiehacker. One becomes a successful Indiehacker when one starts to solve pain-killer problems in the market they understand, for an audience they care about and consistently engage with for a long enough timeframe. Therefore an unsuccessful Indiehacker in a single sentence is An unsuccessful Indiehacker constantly enters new markets they don’t understand to build solutions for people whose problems they don’t care about, in a timeframe that is shorter than than the time they spent thinking about distribution. However, an important note to be made. Life is not just about indiehacking. It’s about learning and having fun. In the human world, the best journey isn’t the one that gets you the fastest to your goals but the one you enjoy the most. I enjoyed making those silly little projects and although I do not regret them, I will not repeat the same mistakes in 2024. But while it’s still 2023, I have 2 more projects I want to do :) EDIT: For Devs, frontend is always react with vite (ts) and backend is either node with express (ts) or python. For DB either Postgres or mongo (usually Prisma for ORM). For deployment all of it is on AWS (S3, EC2). In terms of libraries/APIs Whisper.cpp is best open source for transcription Obviously the gpt apis Eleven labs for voice related stuff And other random stuff here and there

How me and my team made 15+ apps and not made a single sale in 2023
reddit
LLM Vibe Score0
Human Vibe Score0.818
MichaelbetterecycleThis week

How me and my team made 15+ apps and not made a single sale in 2023

Hey, my name is Michael, I am in Auckland NZ. This year was the official beginning of my adult life. I graduated from university and started a full-time job. I’ve also really dug into indiehacking/bootstrapping and started 15 projects (and it will be at least 17 before the year ends). I think I’ve learned a lot but I consciously repeated mistakes. Upto (Nov) Discord Statuses + Your Location + Facebook Poke https://preview.redd.it/4nqt7tp2tf5c1.png?width=572&format=png&auto=webp&s=b0223484bc54b45b5c65e0b1afd0dc52f9c02ad1 This was the end of uni, I often messaged (and got messaged) requests of status and location to (and from my) friends. I thought, what if we make a social app that’s super basic and all it does is show you where your friends are? To differentiate from snap maps and others we wanted something with more privacy where you select the location. However, never finished the codebase or launched it. This is because I slowly started to realize that B2C (especially social networks) are way too hard to make into an actual business and the story with Fistbump would repeat itself. However, this decision not to launch it almost launched a curse on our team. From that point, we permitted ourselves to abandon projects even before launching. Lessons: Don’t do social networks if your goal is 10k MRR ASAP. If you build something to 90% competition ship it or you will think it’s okay to abandon projects Insight Bites (Nov) Youtube Summarizer Extension ​ https://preview.redd.it/h6drqej4tf5c1.jpg?width=800&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=0f211456c390ac06f4fcb54aa51f9d50b0826658 Right after Upto, we started ideating and conveniently the biggest revolution in the recent history of tech was released → GPT. We instantly began ideating. The first problem we chose to use AI for is to summarize YouTube videos. Comical. Nevertheless, I am convinced we have had the best UX because you could right-click on a video to get a slideshow of insights instead of how everyone else did it. We dropped it because there was too much competition and unit economics didn’t work out (and it was a B2C). PodPigeon (Dec) Podcast → Tweet Threads https://preview.redd.it/0ukge245tf5c1.png?width=2498&format=png&auto=webp&s=23303e1cab330578a3d25cd688fa67aa3b97fb60 Then we thought, to make unit economics work we need to make this worthwhile for podcasters. This is when I got into Twitter and started seeing people summarize podcasts. Then I thought, what if we make something that converts a podcast into tweets? This was probably one of the most important projects because it connected me with Jason and Jonaed, both of whom I regularly stay in contact with and are my go-to experts on ideas related to content creation. Jonaed was even willing to buy Podpigeon and was using it on his own time. However, the unit economics still didn’t work out (and we got excited about other things). Furthermore, we got scared of the competition because I found 1 - 2 other people who did similar things poorly. This was probably the biggest mistake we’ve made. Very similar projects made 10k MRR and more, launching later than we did. We didn’t have a coherent product vision, we didn’t understand the customer well enough, and we had a bad outlook on competition and a myriad of other things. Lessons: I already made another post about the importance of outlook on competition. Do not quit just because there are competitors or just because you can’t be 10x better. Indiehackers and Bootstrappers (or even startups) need to differentiate in the market, which can be via product (UX/UI), distribution, or both. Asking Ace Intro.co + Crowdsharing ​ https://preview.redd.it/0hu2tt16tf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=3d397568ef2331e78198d64fafc1a701a3e75999 As I got into Twitter, I wanted to chat with some people I saw there. However, they were really expensive. I thought, what if we made some kind of crowdfunding service for other entrepreneurs to get a private lecture from their idols? It seemed to make a lot of sense on paper. It was solving a problem (validated via the fact that Intro.co is a thing and making things cheaper and accessible is a solid ground to stand on), we understood the market (or so we thought), and it could monetize relatively quickly. However, after 1-2 posts on Reddit and Indiehackers, we quickly learned three things. Firstly, no one cares. Secondly, even if they do, they think they can get the same information for free online. Thirdly, the reasons before are bad because for the first point → we barely talked to people, and for the second people → we barely talked to the wrong people. However, at least we didn’t code anything this time and tried to validate via a landing page. Lessons Don’t give up after 1 Redditor says “I don’t need this” Don’t be scared to choose successful people as your audience. Clarito Journaling with AI analyzer https://preview.redd.it/8ria2wq6tf5c1.jpg?width=1108&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=586ec28ae75003d9f71b4af2520b748d53dd2854 Clarito is a classic problem all amateur entrepreneurs have. It’s where you lie to yourself that you have a real problem and therefore is validated but when your team asks you how much you would pay you say I guess you will pay, maybe, like 5 bucks a month…? Turns out, you’d have to pay me to use our own product lol. We sent it off to a few friends and posted on some forums, but never really got anything tangible and decided to move away. Honestly, a lot of it is us in our own heads. We say the market is too saturated, it’ll be hard to monetize, it’s B2C, etc. Lessons: You use the Mom Test on other people. You have to do it yourself as well. However, recognizing that the Mom Test requires a lot of creativity in its investigation because knowing what questions to ask can determine the outcome of the validation. I asked myself “Do I journal” but I didn’t ask myself “How often do I want GPT to chyme in on my reflections”. Which was practically never. That being said I think with the right audience and distribution, this product can work. I just don’t know (let alone care) about the audience that much (and I thought I was one of them)/ Horns & Claw Scrapes financial news texts you whether you should buy/sell the stock (news sentiment analysis) ​ https://preview.redd.it/gvfxdgc7tf5c1.jpg?width=1287&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=63977bbc33fe74147b1f72913cefee4a9ebec9c2 This one we didn’t even bother launching. Probably something internal in the team and also seemed too good to be true (because if this works, doesn’t that just make us ultra-rich fast?). I saw a similar tool making 10k MRR so I guess I was wrong. Lessons: This one was pretty much just us getting into our heads. I declared that without an audience it would be impossible to ship this product and we needed to start a YouTube channel. Lol, and we did. And we couldn’t even film for 1 minute. I made bold statements like “We will commit to this for at least 1 year no matter what”. Learnery Make courses about any subject https://preview.redd.it/1nw6z448tf5c1.jpg?width=1112&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=f2c73e8af23b0a6c3747a81e785960d4004feb48 This is probably the most “successful” project we’ve made. It grew from a couple of dozen to a couple of hundred users. It has 11 buy events for $9.99 LTD (we couldn’t be bothered connecting Stripe because we thought no one would buy it anyway). However what got us discouraged from seriously pursuing it more is, that this has very low defensibility, “Why wouldn’t someone just use chatGPT?” and it’s B2C so it’s hard to monetize. I used it myself for a month or so but then stopped. I don’t think it’s the app, I think the act of learning a concept from scratch isn’t something you do constantly in the way Learnery delivers it (ie course). I saw a bunch of similar apps that look like Ass make like 10k MRR. Lessons: Don’t do B2C, or if you do, do it properly Don’t just Mixpanel the buy button, connect your Stripe otherwise, it doesn’t feel real and you won’t get momentum. I doubt anyone (even me) will make this mistake again. I live in my GPT bubble where I make assumptions that everyone uses GPT the same way and as much as I do. In reality, the argument that this has low defensibility against GPT is invalid. Platforms that deliver a differentiated UX from ChatGPT to audiences who are not tightly integrated into the habit of using ChatGPT (which is like - everyone except for SOME tech evangelists). CuriosityFM Make podcasts about any subject https://preview.redd.it/zmosrcp8tf5c1.jpg?width=638&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=d04ddffabef9050050b0d87939273cc96a8637dc This was our attempt at making Learnery more unique and more differentiated from chatGPT. We never really launched it. The unit economics didn’t work out and it was actually pretty boring to listen to, I don’t think I even fully listened to one 15-minute episode. I think this wasn’t that bad, it taught us more about ElevenLabs and voice AI. It took us maybe only 2-3 days to build so I think building to learn a new groundbreaking technology is fine. SleepyTale Make children’s bedtime stories https://preview.redd.it/14ue9nm9tf5c1.jpg?width=807&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=267e18ec6f9270e6d1d11564b38136fa524966a1 My 8-year-old sister gave me that idea. She was too scared of making tea and I was curious about how she’d react if she heard a bedtime story about that exact scenario with the moral that I wanted her to absorb (which is that you shouldn’t be scared to try new things ie stop asking me to make your tea and do it yourself, it’s not that hard. You could say I went full Goebbels on her). Zane messaged a bunch of parents on Facebook but no one really cared. We showed this to one Lady at the place we worked from at Uni and she was impressed and wanted to show it to her kids but we already turned off our ElevenLabs subscription. Lessons: However, the truth behind this is beyond just “you need to be able to distribute”. It’s that you have to care about the audience. I don’t particularly want to build products for kids and parents. I am far away from that audience because I am neither a kid anymore nor going to be a parent anytime soon, and my sister still asked me to make her tea so the story didn’t work. I think it’s important to ask yourself whether you care about the audience. The way you answer that even when you are in full bias mode is, do you engage with them? Are you interested in what’s happening in their communities? Are you friends with them? Etc. User Survey Analyzer Big User Survey → GPT → Insights Report Me and my coworker were chatting about AI when he asked me to help him analyze a massive survey for him. I thought that was some pretty decent validation. Someone in an actual company asking for help. Lessons Market research is important but moving fast is also important. Ie building momentum. Also don’t revolve around 1 user. This has been a problem in multiple projects. Finding as many users as possible in the beginning to talk to is key. Otherwise, you are just waiting for 1 person to get back to you. AutoI18N Automated Internationalization of the codebase for webapps This one I might still do. It’s hard to find a solid distribution strategy. However, the idea came from me having to do it at my day job. It seems a solid problem. I’d say it’s validated and has some good players already. The key will be differentiation via the simplicity of UX and distribution (which means a slightly different audience). In the backlog for now because I don’t care about the problem or the audience that much. Documate - Part 1 Converts complex PDFs into Excel https://preview.redd.it/8b45k9katf5c1.jpg?width=1344&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=57324b8720eb22782e28794d2db674b073193995 My mom needed to convert a catalog of furniture into an inventory which took her 3 full days of data entry. I automated it for her and thought this could have a big impact but there was no distribution because there was no ICP. We tried to find the ideal customers by talking to a bunch of different demographics but I flew to Kazakhstan for a holiday and so this kind of fizzled out. I am not writing this blog post linearity, this is my 2nd hour and I am tired and don’t want to finish this later so I don’t even know what lessons I learned. Figmatic Marketplace of high-quality Figma mockups of real apps https://preview.redd.it/h13yv45btf5c1.jpg?width=873&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=aaa2896aeac2f22e9b7d9eed98c28bb8a2d2cdf1 This was a collab between me and my friend Alex. It was the classic Clarito where we both thought we had this problem and would pay to fix it. In reality, this is a vitamin. Neither I, nor I doubt Alex have thought of this as soon as we bought the domain. We posted it on Gumroad, sent it to a bunch of forums, and called it a day. Same issue as almost all the other ones. No distribution strategy. However, apps like Mobin show us that this concept is indeed profitable but it takes time. It needs SEO. It needs a community. None of those things, me and Alex had or was interested in. However shortly after HTML → Figma came out and it’s the best plugin. Maybe that should’ve been the idea. Podcast → Course Turns Podcaster’s episodes into a course This one I got baited by Jason :P I described to him the idea of repurposing his content for a course. He told me this was epic and he would pay. Then after I sent him the demo, he never checked it out. Anyhow during the development, we realized that doesn’t actually work because A podcast doesn’t have the correct format for the course, the most you can extract are concepts and ideas, seldom explanations. Most creators want video-based courses to be hosted on Kajabi or Udemy Another lesson is that when you pitch something to a user, what you articulate is a platform or a process, they imagine an outcome. However, the end result of your platform can be a very different outcome to what they had in mind and there is even a chance that what they want is not possible. You need to understand really well what the outcome looks like before you design the process. This is a classic problem where we thought of the solution before the problem. Yes, the problem exists. Podcasters want to make courses. However, if you really understand what they want, you can see how repurposing a podcast isn’t the best way to get there. However I only really spoke to 1-2 podcasters about this so making conclusions is dangerous for this can just be another asking ace mistake with the Redditor. Documate Part 2 Same concept as before but now I want to run some ads. We’ll see what happens. https://preview.redd.it/xb3npj0ctf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=3cd4884a29fd11d870d010a2677b585551c49193 In conclusion https://preview.redd.it/2zrldc9dtf5c1.jpg?width=1840&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=2b3105073e752ad41c23f205dbd1ea046c1da7ff It doesn’t actually matter that much whether you choose to do a B2C, or a social network or focus on growing your audience. All of these can make you successful. What’s important is that you choose. If I had to summarize my 2023 in one word it’s indecision. Most of these projects succeeded for other people, nothing was as fundamentally wrong about them as I proclaimed. In reality that itself was an excuse. New ideas seduce, and it is a form of discipline to commit to a single project for a respectful amount of time. https://preview.redd.it/zy9a2vzdtf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=901c621227bba0feb4efdb39142f66ab2ebb86fe Distribution is not just posting on Indiehackers and Reddit. It’s an actual strategy and you should think of it as soon as you think of the idea, even before the Figma designs. I like how Denis Shatalin taught me. You have to build a pipeline. That means a reliable way to get leads, launch campaigns at them, close deals, learn from them, and optimize. Whenever I get an idea now I always try to ask myself “Where can I find 1000s leads in one day?” If there is no good answer, this is not a good project to do now. ​ https://preview.redd.it/2boh3fpetf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=1c0d5d7b000716fcbbb00cbad495e8b61e25be66 Talk to users before doing anything. Jumping on designing and coding to make your idea a reality is a satisfying activity in the short term. Especially for me, I like to create for the sake of creation. However, it is so important to understand the market, understand the audience, understand the distribution. There are a lot of things to understand before coding. https://preview.redd.it/lv8tt96ftf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=6c8735aa6ad795f216ff9ddfa2341712e8277724 Get out of your own head. The real reason we dropped so many projects is that we got into our own heads. We let the negative thoughts creep in and kill all the optimism. I am really good at coming up with excuses to start a project. However, I am equally as good at coming up with reasons to kill a project. And so you have this yin and yang of starting and stopping. Building momentum and not burning out. I can say with certainty my team ran out of juice this year. We lost momentum so many times we got burnt out towards the end. Realizing that the project itself has momentum is important. User feedback and sales bring momentum. Building also creates momentum but unless it is matched with an equal force of impact, it can stomp the project down. That is why so many of our projects died quickly after we launched. The smarter approach is to do things that have a low investment of momentum (like talking to users) but result in high impact (sales or feedback). Yes, that means the project can get invalidated which makes it more short-lived than if we built it first, but it preserves team life energy. At the end of 2023 here is a single sentence I am making about how I think one becomes a successful indiehacker. One becomes a successful Indiehacker when one starts to solve pain-killer problems in the market they understand, for an audience they care about and consistently engage with for a long enough timeframe. Therefore an unsuccessful Indiehacker in a single sentence is An unsuccessful Indiehacker constantly enters new markets they don’t understand to build solutions for people whose problems they don’t care about, in a timeframe that is shorter than than the time they spent thinking about distribution. However, an important note to be made. Life is not just about indiehacking. It’s about learning and having fun. In the human world, the best journey isn’t the one that gets you the fastest to your goals but the one you enjoy the most. I enjoyed making those silly little projects and although I do not regret them, I will not repeat the same mistakes in 2024. But while it’s still 2023, I have 2 more projects I want to do :) EDIT: For Devs, frontend is always react with vite (ts) and backend is either node with express (ts) or python. For DB either Postgres or mongo (usually Prisma for ORM). For deployment all of it is on AWS (S3, EC2). In terms of libraries/APIs Whisper.cpp is best open source for transcription Obviously the gpt apis Eleven labs for voice related stuff And other random stuff here and there

How me and my team made 15+ apps and not made a single sale in 2023
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MichaelbetterecycleThis week

How me and my team made 15+ apps and not made a single sale in 2023

Hey, my name is Michael, I am in Auckland NZ. This year was the official beginning of my adult life. I graduated from university and started a full-time job. I’ve also really dug into indiehacking/bootstrapping and started 15 projects (and it will be at least 17 before the year ends). I think I’ve learned a lot but I consciously repeated mistakes. Upto (Nov) Discord Statuses + Your Location + Facebook Poke https://preview.redd.it/4nqt7tp2tf5c1.png?width=572&format=png&auto=webp&s=b0223484bc54b45b5c65e0b1afd0dc52f9c02ad1 This was the end of uni, I often messaged (and got messaged) requests of status and location to (and from my) friends. I thought, what if we make a social app that’s super basic and all it does is show you where your friends are? To differentiate from snap maps and others we wanted something with more privacy where you select the location. However, never finished the codebase or launched it. This is because I slowly started to realize that B2C (especially social networks) are way too hard to make into an actual business and the story with Fistbump would repeat itself. However, this decision not to launch it almost launched a curse on our team. From that point, we permitted ourselves to abandon projects even before launching. Lessons: Don’t do social networks if your goal is 10k MRR ASAP. If you build something to 90% competition ship it or you will think it’s okay to abandon projects Insight Bites (Nov) Youtube Summarizer Extension ​ https://preview.redd.it/h6drqej4tf5c1.jpg?width=800&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=0f211456c390ac06f4fcb54aa51f9d50b0826658 Right after Upto, we started ideating and conveniently the biggest revolution in the recent history of tech was released → GPT. We instantly began ideating. The first problem we chose to use AI for is to summarize YouTube videos. Comical. Nevertheless, I am convinced we have had the best UX because you could right-click on a video to get a slideshow of insights instead of how everyone else did it. We dropped it because there was too much competition and unit economics didn’t work out (and it was a B2C). PodPigeon (Dec) Podcast → Tweet Threads https://preview.redd.it/0ukge245tf5c1.png?width=2498&format=png&auto=webp&s=23303e1cab330578a3d25cd688fa67aa3b97fb60 Then we thought, to make unit economics work we need to make this worthwhile for podcasters. This is when I got into Twitter and started seeing people summarize podcasts. Then I thought, what if we make something that converts a podcast into tweets? This was probably one of the most important projects because it connected me with Jason and Jonaed, both of whom I regularly stay in contact with and are my go-to experts on ideas related to content creation. Jonaed was even willing to buy Podpigeon and was using it on his own time. However, the unit economics still didn’t work out (and we got excited about other things). Furthermore, we got scared of the competition because I found 1 - 2 other people who did similar things poorly. This was probably the biggest mistake we’ve made. Very similar projects made 10k MRR and more, launching later than we did. We didn’t have a coherent product vision, we didn’t understand the customer well enough, and we had a bad outlook on competition and a myriad of other things. Lessons: I already made another post about the importance of outlook on competition. Do not quit just because there are competitors or just because you can’t be 10x better. Indiehackers and Bootstrappers (or even startups) need to differentiate in the market, which can be via product (UX/UI), distribution, or both. Asking Ace Intro.co + Crowdsharing ​ https://preview.redd.it/0hu2tt16tf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=3d397568ef2331e78198d64fafc1a701a3e75999 As I got into Twitter, I wanted to chat with some people I saw there. However, they were really expensive. I thought, what if we made some kind of crowdfunding service for other entrepreneurs to get a private lecture from their idols? It seemed to make a lot of sense on paper. It was solving a problem (validated via the fact that Intro.co is a thing and making things cheaper and accessible is a solid ground to stand on), we understood the market (or so we thought), and it could monetize relatively quickly. However, after 1-2 posts on Reddit and Indiehackers, we quickly learned three things. Firstly, no one cares. Secondly, even if they do, they think they can get the same information for free online. Thirdly, the reasons before are bad because for the first point → we barely talked to people, and for the second people → we barely talked to the wrong people. However, at least we didn’t code anything this time and tried to validate via a landing page. Lessons Don’t give up after 1 Redditor says “I don’t need this” Don’t be scared to choose successful people as your audience. Clarito Journaling with AI analyzer https://preview.redd.it/8ria2wq6tf5c1.jpg?width=1108&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=586ec28ae75003d9f71b4af2520b748d53dd2854 Clarito is a classic problem all amateur entrepreneurs have. It’s where you lie to yourself that you have a real problem and therefore is validated but when your team asks you how much you would pay you say I guess you will pay, maybe, like 5 bucks a month…? Turns out, you’d have to pay me to use our own product lol. We sent it off to a few friends and posted on some forums, but never really got anything tangible and decided to move away. Honestly, a lot of it is us in our own heads. We say the market is too saturated, it’ll be hard to monetize, it’s B2C, etc. Lessons: You use the Mom Test on other people. You have to do it yourself as well. However, recognizing that the Mom Test requires a lot of creativity in its investigation because knowing what questions to ask can determine the outcome of the validation. I asked myself “Do I journal” but I didn’t ask myself “How often do I want GPT to chyme in on my reflections”. Which was practically never. That being said I think with the right audience and distribution, this product can work. I just don’t know (let alone care) about the audience that much (and I thought I was one of them)/ Horns & Claw Scrapes financial news texts you whether you should buy/sell the stock (news sentiment analysis) ​ https://preview.redd.it/gvfxdgc7tf5c1.jpg?width=1287&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=63977bbc33fe74147b1f72913cefee4a9ebec9c2 This one we didn’t even bother launching. Probably something internal in the team and also seemed too good to be true (because if this works, doesn’t that just make us ultra-rich fast?). I saw a similar tool making 10k MRR so I guess I was wrong. Lessons: This one was pretty much just us getting into our heads. I declared that without an audience it would be impossible to ship this product and we needed to start a YouTube channel. Lol, and we did. And we couldn’t even film for 1 minute. I made bold statements like “We will commit to this for at least 1 year no matter what”. Learnery Make courses about any subject https://preview.redd.it/1nw6z448tf5c1.jpg?width=1112&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=f2c73e8af23b0a6c3747a81e785960d4004feb48 This is probably the most “successful” project we’ve made. It grew from a couple of dozen to a couple of hundred users. It has 11 buy events for $9.99 LTD (we couldn’t be bothered connecting Stripe because we thought no one would buy it anyway). However what got us discouraged from seriously pursuing it more is, that this has very low defensibility, “Why wouldn’t someone just use chatGPT?” and it’s B2C so it’s hard to monetize. I used it myself for a month or so but then stopped. I don’t think it’s the app, I think the act of learning a concept from scratch isn’t something you do constantly in the way Learnery delivers it (ie course). I saw a bunch of similar apps that look like Ass make like 10k MRR. Lessons: Don’t do B2C, or if you do, do it properly Don’t just Mixpanel the buy button, connect your Stripe otherwise, it doesn’t feel real and you won’t get momentum. I doubt anyone (even me) will make this mistake again. I live in my GPT bubble where I make assumptions that everyone uses GPT the same way and as much as I do. In reality, the argument that this has low defensibility against GPT is invalid. Platforms that deliver a differentiated UX from ChatGPT to audiences who are not tightly integrated into the habit of using ChatGPT (which is like - everyone except for SOME tech evangelists). CuriosityFM Make podcasts about any subject https://preview.redd.it/zmosrcp8tf5c1.jpg?width=638&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=d04ddffabef9050050b0d87939273cc96a8637dc This was our attempt at making Learnery more unique and more differentiated from chatGPT. We never really launched it. The unit economics didn’t work out and it was actually pretty boring to listen to, I don’t think I even fully listened to one 15-minute episode. I think this wasn’t that bad, it taught us more about ElevenLabs and voice AI. It took us maybe only 2-3 days to build so I think building to learn a new groundbreaking technology is fine. SleepyTale Make children’s bedtime stories https://preview.redd.it/14ue9nm9tf5c1.jpg?width=807&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=267e18ec6f9270e6d1d11564b38136fa524966a1 My 8-year-old sister gave me that idea. She was too scared of making tea and I was curious about how she’d react if she heard a bedtime story about that exact scenario with the moral that I wanted her to absorb (which is that you shouldn’t be scared to try new things ie stop asking me to make your tea and do it yourself, it’s not that hard. You could say I went full Goebbels on her). Zane messaged a bunch of parents on Facebook but no one really cared. We showed this to one Lady at the place we worked from at Uni and she was impressed and wanted to show it to her kids but we already turned off our ElevenLabs subscription. Lessons: However, the truth behind this is beyond just “you need to be able to distribute”. It’s that you have to care about the audience. I don’t particularly want to build products for kids and parents. I am far away from that audience because I am neither a kid anymore nor going to be a parent anytime soon, and my sister still asked me to make her tea so the story didn’t work. I think it’s important to ask yourself whether you care about the audience. The way you answer that even when you are in full bias mode is, do you engage with them? Are you interested in what’s happening in their communities? Are you friends with them? Etc. User Survey Analyzer Big User Survey → GPT → Insights Report Me and my coworker were chatting about AI when he asked me to help him analyze a massive survey for him. I thought that was some pretty decent validation. Someone in an actual company asking for help. Lessons Market research is important but moving fast is also important. Ie building momentum. Also don’t revolve around 1 user. This has been a problem in multiple projects. Finding as many users as possible in the beginning to talk to is key. Otherwise, you are just waiting for 1 person to get back to you. AutoI18N Automated Internationalization of the codebase for webapps This one I might still do. It’s hard to find a solid distribution strategy. However, the idea came from me having to do it at my day job. It seems a solid problem. I’d say it’s validated and has some good players already. The key will be differentiation via the simplicity of UX and distribution (which means a slightly different audience). In the backlog for now because I don’t care about the problem or the audience that much. Documate - Part 1 Converts complex PDFs into Excel https://preview.redd.it/8b45k9katf5c1.jpg?width=1344&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=57324b8720eb22782e28794d2db674b073193995 My mom needed to convert a catalog of furniture into an inventory which took her 3 full days of data entry. I automated it for her and thought this could have a big impact but there was no distribution because there was no ICP. We tried to find the ideal customers by talking to a bunch of different demographics but I flew to Kazakhstan for a holiday and so this kind of fizzled out. I am not writing this blog post linearity, this is my 2nd hour and I am tired and don’t want to finish this later so I don’t even know what lessons I learned. Figmatic Marketplace of high-quality Figma mockups of real apps https://preview.redd.it/h13yv45btf5c1.jpg?width=873&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=aaa2896aeac2f22e9b7d9eed98c28bb8a2d2cdf1 This was a collab between me and my friend Alex. It was the classic Clarito where we both thought we had this problem and would pay to fix it. In reality, this is a vitamin. Neither I, nor I doubt Alex have thought of this as soon as we bought the domain. We posted it on Gumroad, sent it to a bunch of forums, and called it a day. Same issue as almost all the other ones. No distribution strategy. However, apps like Mobin show us that this concept is indeed profitable but it takes time. It needs SEO. It needs a community. None of those things, me and Alex had or was interested in. However shortly after HTML → Figma came out and it’s the best plugin. Maybe that should’ve been the idea. Podcast → Course Turns Podcaster’s episodes into a course This one I got baited by Jason :P I described to him the idea of repurposing his content for a course. He told me this was epic and he would pay. Then after I sent him the demo, he never checked it out. Anyhow during the development, we realized that doesn’t actually work because A podcast doesn’t have the correct format for the course, the most you can extract are concepts and ideas, seldom explanations. Most creators want video-based courses to be hosted on Kajabi or Udemy Another lesson is that when you pitch something to a user, what you articulate is a platform or a process, they imagine an outcome. However, the end result of your platform can be a very different outcome to what they had in mind and there is even a chance that what they want is not possible. You need to understand really well what the outcome looks like before you design the process. This is a classic problem where we thought of the solution before the problem. Yes, the problem exists. Podcasters want to make courses. However, if you really understand what they want, you can see how repurposing a podcast isn’t the best way to get there. However I only really spoke to 1-2 podcasters about this so making conclusions is dangerous for this can just be another asking ace mistake with the Redditor. Documate Part 2 Same concept as before but now I want to run some ads. We’ll see what happens. https://preview.redd.it/xb3npj0ctf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=3cd4884a29fd11d870d010a2677b585551c49193 In conclusion https://preview.redd.it/2zrldc9dtf5c1.jpg?width=1840&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=2b3105073e752ad41c23f205dbd1ea046c1da7ff It doesn’t actually matter that much whether you choose to do a B2C, or a social network or focus on growing your audience. All of these can make you successful. What’s important is that you choose. If I had to summarize my 2023 in one word it’s indecision. Most of these projects succeeded for other people, nothing was as fundamentally wrong about them as I proclaimed. In reality that itself was an excuse. New ideas seduce, and it is a form of discipline to commit to a single project for a respectful amount of time. https://preview.redd.it/zy9a2vzdtf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=901c621227bba0feb4efdb39142f66ab2ebb86fe Distribution is not just posting on Indiehackers and Reddit. It’s an actual strategy and you should think of it as soon as you think of the idea, even before the Figma designs. I like how Denis Shatalin taught me. You have to build a pipeline. That means a reliable way to get leads, launch campaigns at them, close deals, learn from them, and optimize. Whenever I get an idea now I always try to ask myself “Where can I find 1000s leads in one day?” If there is no good answer, this is not a good project to do now. ​ https://preview.redd.it/2boh3fpetf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=1c0d5d7b000716fcbbb00cbad495e8b61e25be66 Talk to users before doing anything. Jumping on designing and coding to make your idea a reality is a satisfying activity in the short term. Especially for me, I like to create for the sake of creation. However, it is so important to understand the market, understand the audience, understand the distribution. There are a lot of things to understand before coding. https://preview.redd.it/lv8tt96ftf5c1.jpg?width=1456&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=6c8735aa6ad795f216ff9ddfa2341712e8277724 Get out of your own head. The real reason we dropped so many projects is that we got into our own heads. We let the negative thoughts creep in and kill all the optimism. I am really good at coming up with excuses to start a project. However, I am equally as good at coming up with reasons to kill a project. And so you have this yin and yang of starting and stopping. Building momentum and not burning out. I can say with certainty my team ran out of juice this year. We lost momentum so many times we got burnt out towards the end. Realizing that the project itself has momentum is important. User feedback and sales bring momentum. Building also creates momentum but unless it is matched with an equal force of impact, it can stomp the project down. That is why so many of our projects died quickly after we launched. The smarter approach is to do things that have a low investment of momentum (like talking to users) but result in high impact (sales or feedback). Yes, that means the project can get invalidated which makes it more short-lived than if we built it first, but it preserves team life energy. At the end of 2023 here is a single sentence I am making about how I think one becomes a successful indiehacker. One becomes a successful Indiehacker when one starts to solve pain-killer problems in the market they understand, for an audience they care about and consistently engage with for a long enough timeframe. Therefore an unsuccessful Indiehacker in a single sentence is An unsuccessful Indiehacker constantly enters new markets they don’t understand to build solutions for people whose problems they don’t care about, in a timeframe that is shorter than than the time they spent thinking about distribution. However, an important note to be made. Life is not just about indiehacking. It’s about learning and having fun. In the human world, the best journey isn’t the one that gets you the fastest to your goals but the one you enjoy the most. I enjoyed making those silly little projects and although I do not regret them, I will not repeat the same mistakes in 2024. But while it’s still 2023, I have 2 more projects I want to do :) EDIT: For Devs, frontend is always react with vite (ts) and backend is either node with express (ts) or python. For DB either Postgres or mongo (usually Prisma for ORM). For deployment all of it is on AWS (S3, EC2). In terms of libraries/APIs Whisper.cpp is best open source for transcription Obviously the gpt apis Eleven labs for voice related stuff And other random stuff here and there

[Discussion] When ML and Data Science are the death of a good company: A cautionary tale.
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AlexSnakeKingThis week

[Discussion] When ML and Data Science are the death of a good company: A cautionary tale.

TD;LR: At Company A, Team X does advanced analytics using on-prem ERP tools and older programming languages. Their tools work very well and are designed based on very deep business and domain expertise. Team Y is a new and ambitious Data Science team that thinks they can replace Team X's tools with a bunch of R scripts and a custom built ML platform. Their models are simplistic, but more "fashionable" compared to the econometric models used by Team X, and team Y benefits from the ML/DS moniker so leadership is allowing Team Y to start a large scale overhaul of the analytics platform in question. Team Y doesn't have the experience for such a larger scale transformation, and is refusing to collaborate with team X. This project is very likely going to fail, and cause serious harm to the company as a whole financially and from a people perspective. I argue that this is not just because of bad leadership, but also because of various trends and mindsets in the DS community at large. Update (Jump to below the line for the original story): Several people in the comments are pointing out that this just a management failure, not something due to ML/DS, and that you can replace DS with any buzz tech and the story will still be relevant. My response: Of course, any failure at an organization level is ultimately a management failure one way or the other. Moreover, it is also the case that ML/DS when done correctly, will always improve a company's bottom line. There is no scenario where the proper ML solution, delivered at a reasonable cost and in a timely fashion, will somehow hurt the company's bottom line. My point is that in this case management is failing because of certain trends and practices that are specific to the ML/DS community, namely: The idea that DS teams should operate independently of tech and business orgs -- too much autonomy for DS teams The disregard for domain knowledge that seems prevalent nowadays thanks to the ML hype, that DS can be generalists and someone with good enough ML chops can solve any business problem. That wasn't the case when I first left academia for the industry in 2009 (back then nobody would even bother with a phone screen if you didn't have the right domain knowledge). Over reliance on resources who check all the ML hype related boxes (knows Python, R, Tensorflow, Shiny, etc..., has the right Coursera certifications, has blogged on the topic, etc...), but are lacking in depth of experience. DS interviews nowadays all seem to be: Can you tell me what a p-value is? What is elastic net regression? Show me how to fit a model in sklearn? How do you impute NAs in an R dataframe? Any smart person can look those up on Stackoverflow or Cross-Validated,.....Instead teams should be asking stuff like: why does portfolio optimization use QP not LP? How does a forecast influence a customer service level? When should a recommendation engine be content based and when should it use collaborative filtering? etc... (This is a true story, happening to the company I currently work for. Names, domains, algorithms, and roles have been shuffled around to protect my anonymity)  Company A has been around for several decades. It is not the biggest name in its domain, but it is a well respected one. Risk analysis and portfolio optimization have been a core of Company A's business since the 90s. They have a large team of 30 or so analysts who perform those tasks on a daily basis. These analysts use ERP solutions implemented for them by one the big ERP companies (SAP, Teradata, Oracle, JD Edwards,...) or one of the major tech consulting companies (Deloitte, Accenture, PWC, Capgemini, etc...) in collaboration with their own in house engineering team. The tools used are embarrassingly old school: Classic RDBMS running on on-prem servers or maybe even on mainframes, code written in COBOL, Fortran, weird proprietary stuff like ABAP or SPSS.....you get the picture. But the models and analytic functions were pretty sophisticated, and surprisingly cutting edge compared to the published academic literature. Most of all, they fit well with the company's enterprise ecosystem, and were honed based on years of deep domain knowledge.  They have a tech team of several engineers (poached from the aforementioned software and consulting companies) and product managers (who came from the experienced pools of analysts and managers who use the software, or poached from business rivals) maintaining and running this software. Their technology might be old school, but collectively, they know the domain and the company's overall architecture very, very well. They've guided the company through several large scale upgrades and migrations and they have a track record of delivering on time, without too much overhead. The few times they've stumbled, they knew how to pick themselves up very quickly. In fact within their industry niche, they have a reputation for their expertise, and have very good relations with the various vendors they've had to deal with. They were the launching pad of several successful ERP consulting careers.  Interestingly, despite dealing on a daily basis with statistical modeling and optimization algorithms, none of the analysts, engineers, or product managers involved describe themselves as data scientists or machine learning experts. It is mostly a cultural thing: Their expertise predates the Data Science/ML hype that started circa 2010, and they got most of their chops using proprietary enterprise tools instead of the open source tools popular nowadays. A few of them have formal statistical training, but most of them came from engineering or domain backgrounds and learned stats on the fly while doing their job. Call this team "Team X".  Sometime around the mid 2010s, Company A started having some serious anxiety issues: Although still doing very well for a company its size, overall economic and demographic trends were shrinking its customer base, and a couple of so called disruptors came up with a new app and business model that started seriously eating into their revenue. A suitable reaction to appease shareholders and Wall Street was necessary. The company already had a decent website and a pretty snazzy app, what more could be done? Leadership decided that it was high time that AI and ML become a core part of the company's business. An ambitious Manager, with no science or engineering background, but who had very briefly toyed with a recommender system a couple of years back, was chosen to build a data science team, call it team "Y" (he had a bachelor's in history from the local state college and worked for several years in the company's marketing org). Team "Y" consists mostly of internal hires who decided they wanted to be data scientists and completed a Coursera certification or a Galvanize boot camp, before being brought on to the team, along with a few of fresh Ph.D or M.Sc holders who didn't like academia and wanted to try their hand at an industry role. All of them were very bright people, they could write great Medium blog posts and give inspiring TED talks, but collectively they had very little real world industry experience. As is the fashion nowadays, this group was made part of a data science org that reported directly to the CEO and Board, bypassing the CIO and any tech or business VPs, since Company A wanted to claim the monikers "data driven" and "AI powered" in their upcoming shareholder meetings. In 3 or 4 years of existence, team Y produced a few Python and R scripts. Their architectural experience  consisted almost entirely in connecting Flask to S3 buckets or Redshift tables, with a couple of the more resourceful ones learning how to plug their models into Tableau or how to spin up a Kuberneties pod.  But they needn't worry: The aforementioned manager, who was now a director (and was also doing an online Masters to make up for his qualifications gap and bolster his chances of becoming VP soon - at least he now understands what L1 regularization is), was a master at playing corporate politics and self-promotion. No matter how few actionable insights team Y produced or how little code they deployed to production, he always had their back and made sure they had ample funding. In fact he now had grandiose plans for setting up an all-purpose machine learning platform that can be used to solve all of the company's data problems.  A couple of sharp minded members of team Y, upon googling their industry name along with the word "data science", realized that risk analysis was a prime candidate for being solved with Bayesian models, and there was already a nifty R package for doing just that, whose tutorial they went through on R-Bloggers.com. One of them had even submitted a Bayesian classifier Kernel for a competition on Kaggle (he was 203rd on the leaderboard), and was eager to put his new-found expertise to use on a real world problem. They pitched the idea to their director, who saw a perfect use case for his upcoming ML platform. They started work on it immediately, without bothering to check whether anybody at Company A was already doing risk analysis. Since their org was independent, they didn't really need to check with anybody else before they got funding for their initiative. Although it was basically a Naive Bayes classifier, the term ML was added to the project tile, to impress the board.  As they progressed with their work however, tensions started to build. They had asked the data warehousing and CA analytics teams to build pipelines for them, and word eventually got out to team X about their project. Team X was initially thrilled: They offered to collaborate whole heartedly, and would have loved to add an ML based feather to their already impressive cap. The product owners and analysts were totally onboard as well: They saw a chance to get in on the whole Data Science hype that they kept hearing about. But through some weird mix of arrogance and insecurity, team Y refused to collaborate with them or share any of their long term goals with them, even as they went to other parts of the company giving brown bag presentations and tutorials on the new model they created.  Team X got resentful: from what they saw of team Y's model, their approach was hopelessly naive and had little chances of scaling or being sustainable in production, and they knew exactly how to help with that. Deploying the model to production would have taken them a few days, given how comfortable they were with DevOps and continuous delivery (team Y had taken several months to figure out how to deploy a simple R script to production). And despite how old school their own tech was, team X were crafty enough to be able to plug it in to their existing architecture. Moreover, the output of the model was such that it didn't take into account how the business will consume it or how it was going to be fed to downstream systems, and the product owners could have gone a long way in making the model more amenable to adoption by the business stakeholders. But team Y wouldn't listen, and their leads brushed off any attempts at communication, let alone collaboration. The vibe that team Y was giving off was "We are the cutting edge ML team, you guys are the legacy server grunts. We don't need your opinion.", and they seemed to have a complete disregard for domain knowledge, or worse, they thought that all that domain knowledge consisted of was being able to grasp the definitions of a few business metrics.  Team X got frustrated and tried to express their concerns to leadership. But despite owning a vital link in Company A's business process, they were only \~50 people in a large 1000 strong technology and operations org, and they were several layers removed from the C-suite, so it was impossible for them to get their voices heard.  Meanwhile, the unstoppable director was doing what he did best: Playing corporate politics. Despite how little his team had actually delivered, he had convinced the board that all analysis and optimization tasks should now be migrated to his yet to be delivered ML platform. Since most leaders now knew that there was overlap between team Y and team X's objectives, his pitch was no longer that team Y was going to create a new insight, but that they were going to replace (or modernize) the legacy statistics based on-prem tools with more accurate cloud based ML tools. Never mind that there was no support in the academic literature for the idea that Naive Bayes works better than the Econometric approaches used by team X, let alone the additional wacky idea that Bayesian Optimization would definitely outperform the QP solvers that were running in production.  Unbeknownst to team X, the original Bayesian risk analysis project has now grown into a multimillion dollar major overhaul initiative, which included the eventual replacement of all of the tools and functions supported by team X along with the necessary migration to the cloud. The CIO and a couple of business VPs are on now board, and tech leadership is treating it as a done deal. An outside vendor, a startup who nobody had heard of, was contracted to help build the platform, since team Y has no engineering skills. The choice was deliberate, as calling on any of the established consulting or software companies would have eventually led leadership to the conclusion that team X was better suited for a transformation on this scale than team Y.  Team Y has no experience with any major ERP deployments, and no domain knowledge, yet they are being tasked with fundamentally changing the business process that is at the core of Company A's business. Their models actually perform worse than those deployed by team X, and their architecture is hopelessly simplistic, compared to what is necessary for running such a solution in production.  Ironically, using Bayesian thinking and based on all the evidence, the likelihood that team Y succeeds is close to 0%. At best, the project is going to end up being a write off of 50 million dollars or more. Once the !@#$!@hits the fan, a couple of executive heads are going to role, and dozens of people will get laid off. At worst, given how vital risk analysis and portfolio optimization is to Company A's revenue stream, the failure will eventually sink the whole company. It probably won't go bankrupt, but it will lose a significant portion of its business and work force. Failed ERP implementations can and do sink large companies: Just see what happened to National Grid US, SuperValu or Target Canada.  One might argue that this is more about corporate disfunction and bad leadership than about data science and AI. But I disagree. I think the core driver of this debacle is indeed the blind faith in Data Scientists, ML models and the promise of AI, and the overall culture of hype and self promotion that is very common among the ML crowd.  We haven't seen the end of this story: I sincerely hope that this ends well for the sake of my colleagues and all involved. Company A is a good company, and both its customers and its employees deserver better. But the chances of that happening are negligible given all the information available, and this failure will hit my company hard.

[Discussion] When ML and Data Science are the death of a good company: A cautionary tale.
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Human Vibe Score0.6
AlexSnakeKingThis week

[Discussion] When ML and Data Science are the death of a good company: A cautionary tale.

TD;LR: At Company A, Team X does advanced analytics using on-prem ERP tools and older programming languages. Their tools work very well and are designed based on very deep business and domain expertise. Team Y is a new and ambitious Data Science team that thinks they can replace Team X's tools with a bunch of R scripts and a custom built ML platform. Their models are simplistic, but more "fashionable" compared to the econometric models used by Team X, and team Y benefits from the ML/DS moniker so leadership is allowing Team Y to start a large scale overhaul of the analytics platform in question. Team Y doesn't have the experience for such a larger scale transformation, and is refusing to collaborate with team X. This project is very likely going to fail, and cause serious harm to the company as a whole financially and from a people perspective. I argue that this is not just because of bad leadership, but also because of various trends and mindsets in the DS community at large. Update (Jump to below the line for the original story): Several people in the comments are pointing out that this just a management failure, not something due to ML/DS, and that you can replace DS with any buzz tech and the story will still be relevant. My response: Of course, any failure at an organization level is ultimately a management failure one way or the other. Moreover, it is also the case that ML/DS when done correctly, will always improve a company's bottom line. There is no scenario where the proper ML solution, delivered at a reasonable cost and in a timely fashion, will somehow hurt the company's bottom line. My point is that in this case management is failing because of certain trends and practices that are specific to the ML/DS community, namely: The idea that DS teams should operate independently of tech and business orgs -- too much autonomy for DS teams The disregard for domain knowledge that seems prevalent nowadays thanks to the ML hype, that DS can be generalists and someone with good enough ML chops can solve any business problem. That wasn't the case when I first left academia for the industry in 2009 (back then nobody would even bother with a phone screen if you didn't have the right domain knowledge). Over reliance on resources who check all the ML hype related boxes (knows Python, R, Tensorflow, Shiny, etc..., has the right Coursera certifications, has blogged on the topic, etc...), but are lacking in depth of experience. DS interviews nowadays all seem to be: Can you tell me what a p-value is? What is elastic net regression? Show me how to fit a model in sklearn? How do you impute NAs in an R dataframe? Any smart person can look those up on Stackoverflow or Cross-Validated,.....Instead teams should be asking stuff like: why does portfolio optimization use QP not LP? How does a forecast influence a customer service level? When should a recommendation engine be content based and when should it use collaborative filtering? etc... (This is a true story, happening to the company I currently work for. Names, domains, algorithms, and roles have been shuffled around to protect my anonymity)  Company A has been around for several decades. It is not the biggest name in its domain, but it is a well respected one. Risk analysis and portfolio optimization have been a core of Company A's business since the 90s. They have a large team of 30 or so analysts who perform those tasks on a daily basis. These analysts use ERP solutions implemented for them by one the big ERP companies (SAP, Teradata, Oracle, JD Edwards,...) or one of the major tech consulting companies (Deloitte, Accenture, PWC, Capgemini, etc...) in collaboration with their own in house engineering team. The tools used are embarrassingly old school: Classic RDBMS running on on-prem servers or maybe even on mainframes, code written in COBOL, Fortran, weird proprietary stuff like ABAP or SPSS.....you get the picture. But the models and analytic functions were pretty sophisticated, and surprisingly cutting edge compared to the published academic literature. Most of all, they fit well with the company's enterprise ecosystem, and were honed based on years of deep domain knowledge.  They have a tech team of several engineers (poached from the aforementioned software and consulting companies) and product managers (who came from the experienced pools of analysts and managers who use the software, or poached from business rivals) maintaining and running this software. Their technology might be old school, but collectively, they know the domain and the company's overall architecture very, very well. They've guided the company through several large scale upgrades and migrations and they have a track record of delivering on time, without too much overhead. The few times they've stumbled, they knew how to pick themselves up very quickly. In fact within their industry niche, they have a reputation for their expertise, and have very good relations with the various vendors they've had to deal with. They were the launching pad of several successful ERP consulting careers.  Interestingly, despite dealing on a daily basis with statistical modeling and optimization algorithms, none of the analysts, engineers, or product managers involved describe themselves as data scientists or machine learning experts. It is mostly a cultural thing: Their expertise predates the Data Science/ML hype that started circa 2010, and they got most of their chops using proprietary enterprise tools instead of the open source tools popular nowadays. A few of them have formal statistical training, but most of them came from engineering or domain backgrounds and learned stats on the fly while doing their job. Call this team "Team X".  Sometime around the mid 2010s, Company A started having some serious anxiety issues: Although still doing very well for a company its size, overall economic and demographic trends were shrinking its customer base, and a couple of so called disruptors came up with a new app and business model that started seriously eating into their revenue. A suitable reaction to appease shareholders and Wall Street was necessary. The company already had a decent website and a pretty snazzy app, what more could be done? Leadership decided that it was high time that AI and ML become a core part of the company's business. An ambitious Manager, with no science or engineering background, but who had very briefly toyed with a recommender system a couple of years back, was chosen to build a data science team, call it team "Y" (he had a bachelor's in history from the local state college and worked for several years in the company's marketing org). Team "Y" consists mostly of internal hires who decided they wanted to be data scientists and completed a Coursera certification or a Galvanize boot camp, before being brought on to the team, along with a few of fresh Ph.D or M.Sc holders who didn't like academia and wanted to try their hand at an industry role. All of them were very bright people, they could write great Medium blog posts and give inspiring TED talks, but collectively they had very little real world industry experience. As is the fashion nowadays, this group was made part of a data science org that reported directly to the CEO and Board, bypassing the CIO and any tech or business VPs, since Company A wanted to claim the monikers "data driven" and "AI powered" in their upcoming shareholder meetings. In 3 or 4 years of existence, team Y produced a few Python and R scripts. Their architectural experience  consisted almost entirely in connecting Flask to S3 buckets or Redshift tables, with a couple of the more resourceful ones learning how to plug their models into Tableau or how to spin up a Kuberneties pod.  But they needn't worry: The aforementioned manager, who was now a director (and was also doing an online Masters to make up for his qualifications gap and bolster his chances of becoming VP soon - at least he now understands what L1 regularization is), was a master at playing corporate politics and self-promotion. No matter how few actionable insights team Y produced or how little code they deployed to production, he always had their back and made sure they had ample funding. In fact he now had grandiose plans for setting up an all-purpose machine learning platform that can be used to solve all of the company's data problems.  A couple of sharp minded members of team Y, upon googling their industry name along with the word "data science", realized that risk analysis was a prime candidate for being solved with Bayesian models, and there was already a nifty R package for doing just that, whose tutorial they went through on R-Bloggers.com. One of them had even submitted a Bayesian classifier Kernel for a competition on Kaggle (he was 203rd on the leaderboard), and was eager to put his new-found expertise to use on a real world problem. They pitched the idea to their director, who saw a perfect use case for his upcoming ML platform. They started work on it immediately, without bothering to check whether anybody at Company A was already doing risk analysis. Since their org was independent, they didn't really need to check with anybody else before they got funding for their initiative. Although it was basically a Naive Bayes classifier, the term ML was added to the project tile, to impress the board.  As they progressed with their work however, tensions started to build. They had asked the data warehousing and CA analytics teams to build pipelines for them, and word eventually got out to team X about their project. Team X was initially thrilled: They offered to collaborate whole heartedly, and would have loved to add an ML based feather to their already impressive cap. The product owners and analysts were totally onboard as well: They saw a chance to get in on the whole Data Science hype that they kept hearing about. But through some weird mix of arrogance and insecurity, team Y refused to collaborate with them or share any of their long term goals with them, even as they went to other parts of the company giving brown bag presentations and tutorials on the new model they created.  Team X got resentful: from what they saw of team Y's model, their approach was hopelessly naive and had little chances of scaling or being sustainable in production, and they knew exactly how to help with that. Deploying the model to production would have taken them a few days, given how comfortable they were with DevOps and continuous delivery (team Y had taken several months to figure out how to deploy a simple R script to production). And despite how old school their own tech was, team X were crafty enough to be able to plug it in to their existing architecture. Moreover, the output of the model was such that it didn't take into account how the business will consume it or how it was going to be fed to downstream systems, and the product owners could have gone a long way in making the model more amenable to adoption by the business stakeholders. But team Y wouldn't listen, and their leads brushed off any attempts at communication, let alone collaboration. The vibe that team Y was giving off was "We are the cutting edge ML team, you guys are the legacy server grunts. We don't need your opinion.", and they seemed to have a complete disregard for domain knowledge, or worse, they thought that all that domain knowledge consisted of was being able to grasp the definitions of a few business metrics.  Team X got frustrated and tried to express their concerns to leadership. But despite owning a vital link in Company A's business process, they were only \~50 people in a large 1000 strong technology and operations org, and they were several layers removed from the C-suite, so it was impossible for them to get their voices heard.  Meanwhile, the unstoppable director was doing what he did best: Playing corporate politics. Despite how little his team had actually delivered, he had convinced the board that all analysis and optimization tasks should now be migrated to his yet to be delivered ML platform. Since most leaders now knew that there was overlap between team Y and team X's objectives, his pitch was no longer that team Y was going to create a new insight, but that they were going to replace (or modernize) the legacy statistics based on-prem tools with more accurate cloud based ML tools. Never mind that there was no support in the academic literature for the idea that Naive Bayes works better than the Econometric approaches used by team X, let alone the additional wacky idea that Bayesian Optimization would definitely outperform the QP solvers that were running in production.  Unbeknownst to team X, the original Bayesian risk analysis project has now grown into a multimillion dollar major overhaul initiative, which included the eventual replacement of all of the tools and functions supported by team X along with the necessary migration to the cloud. The CIO and a couple of business VPs are on now board, and tech leadership is treating it as a done deal. An outside vendor, a startup who nobody had heard of, was contracted to help build the platform, since team Y has no engineering skills. The choice was deliberate, as calling on any of the established consulting or software companies would have eventually led leadership to the conclusion that team X was better suited for a transformation on this scale than team Y.  Team Y has no experience with any major ERP deployments, and no domain knowledge, yet they are being tasked with fundamentally changing the business process that is at the core of Company A's business. Their models actually perform worse than those deployed by team X, and their architecture is hopelessly simplistic, compared to what is necessary for running such a solution in production.  Ironically, using Bayesian thinking and based on all the evidence, the likelihood that team Y succeeds is close to 0%. At best, the project is going to end up being a write off of 50 million dollars or more. Once the !@#$!@hits the fan, a couple of executive heads are going to role, and dozens of people will get laid off. At worst, given how vital risk analysis and portfolio optimization is to Company A's revenue stream, the failure will eventually sink the whole company. It probably won't go bankrupt, but it will lose a significant portion of its business and work force. Failed ERP implementations can and do sink large companies: Just see what happened to National Grid US, SuperValu or Target Canada.  One might argue that this is more about corporate disfunction and bad leadership than about data science and AI. But I disagree. I think the core driver of this debacle is indeed the blind faith in Data Scientists, ML models and the promise of AI, and the overall culture of hype and self promotion that is very common among the ML crowd.  We haven't seen the end of this story: I sincerely hope that this ends well for the sake of my colleagues and all involved. Company A is a good company, and both its customers and its employees deserver better. But the chances of that happening are negligible given all the information available, and this failure will hit my company hard.

First time founder, looking for guidance
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BigscreennThis week

First time founder, looking for guidance

Hello I am non technical founder based in the UK building a CRM and Order Management System. I have a POC built in Figma that showcases new features that current market options don’t have and improvements on existing features. I lack the technical skill to built a functioning MVP but I do have some technical knowledge. I have enough to understand the complexity and size of what I want to build. My current plan is the following: Raise preseed funding from angel investors or preseed VCs. I have a solid business plan and pitch deck in their final drafts. Find/hire a technical cofounder/development head to build and develop MVP (platform is complex and big enough it will require more then one developer to finish it in a reasonable timeframe) Once MVP is complete, begin sales to ICPs. I have strong connections in the industry already making this step easier. Once the above is done plan is to continue growing, develop main product and create supporting software How would you recommend going forward from the point I’m at? Should I build a functional prototype using a no code webapp builder? Will this be needed when I have a POC in Figma? If so any recommendations? Currently there is no plan for integration of AI but should I add some to drum up more hype when pitching to investors? Adding AI will further improve my planned features but will massively increase complexity. It may be worth noting i have already developed a product internally for my current job that they’re intending to release for internal use down the line. This wasn’t a viable solo business as it was impossible to defend and easy to replicate. Cheers for reading

He makes $750 a day 'Vibe Coding' Apps (using Replit, ChatGPT, Upwork)
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LLM Vibe Score0.379
Human Vibe Score0.77
Greg IsenbergMar 21, 2025

He makes $750 a day 'Vibe Coding' Apps (using Replit, ChatGPT, Upwork)

Billy Howell shares his strategy for making money by building and selling custom web applications using AI tools like Replit. He demonstrates the process by finding projects on Upwork, creating a product requirements document with ChatGPT, and using Replit to automatically generate a functional web application. Billy explains that this approach is less risky than building SaaS products because it validates demand before significant development work. Timestamps: 00:00 - Intro 02:19 - Searching for App Ideas on Upwork 11:04 - Using ChatGPT for PRD Creation 12:22 - Why choose Replit for Development 15:15 - Building Prototype with Replit 19:53 - Areas of Concern when building with AI coders 23:30 - Earning Potential on Upwork 27:55 - The process for selling these Apps 32:03 - Comparing Different Business Models 35:40 - Huge opportunity: Unbundling SaaS 37:44 - Testing App 39:39 - How to standout on Upwork 40:35 - Integrating v0 UI to Replit Key Points • Billy Howell explains his method of "vibe coding" - using AI tools like Replit to quickly build and sell custom web applications • The process involves finding clients on Upwork who need solutions, creating a prototype, and selling it before building the complete app • Billy demonstrates how to use Repl.it with AI assistance to rapidly build a case management system for a nonprofit • The approach focuses on creating simple CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) applications rather than complex systems 1) The "Sell First, Build Later" Framework Billy's #1 rule: Find someone to BUY your app BEFORE you build it. Most developers get this backward - they build something cool then struggle to find users. The secret? Don't market. SELL. How? Look for people ALREADY trying to pay for solutions 2) Upwork Gold Mining Strategy Billy's exact process: • Search Upwork for jobs mentioning expensive SaaS tools (Airtable, HubSpot, etc) • Look for simple CRUD apps (data entry, visualization) • Build a quick prototype in Repl.it • Send a Loom video demo to potential clients His first sale? $750 replacing an Airtable solution! 3) The Vibe Coding Tech Stack Billy's weapons of choice: • Replit for rapid prototyping (zero setup friction!) • ChatGPT to format requirements into PRDs • V0 for beautiful UI mockups • ShadCN components for clean interfaces The magic combo: Feed requirements to Replit + "build me this app" = working prototype in MINUTES. 4) What to Avoid When Vibe Coding Not all projects are created equal! Watch out for: • Payment processing (risky) • DocuSign integrations (complex) • Calendar functionality (AI struggles with time zones) • Anything changing data in other apps Start with simple CRUD apps that store and display information. 5) The Real Money-Making Model Billy's approach isn't just about one-off projects: • Initial build: $750-2,500 • Charge for hosting • Recurring revenue from feature requests • Get referrals to similar businesses One recent client is now reselling his solution to other companies in the same industry! 6) Why This Beats Building a SaaS Building a traditional SaaS = "nightmare money pit" according to Billy. With vibe coding consulting: • De-risk by getting paid upfront • Learn across multiple projects • No marketing costs • Discover validated problems • Build a portfolio of solutions Six figures on Upwork is VERY doable. 7) The 60-Second Sales Pitch Billy's exact closing technique: • Find job posting • Make mockup in V0 or Replit • Record 1-minute Loom: "I'm Billy, I make apps. I know you wanted Airtable, but I made this custom for you." • Personalize with company name • Send and repeat Simple. Effective. PROFITABLE. The future of coding isn't about knowing every framework—it's about SOLVING PROBLEMS quickly. Anyone can do this with the right tools and approach. Notable Quotes: "The number one thing is how to sell an app that you've built... And the secret is not to market. It's just to sell it." - Billy Howell "We start, we need to find someone to buy the app before we build it. That's where most people get this wrong, is they build something and then try to sell it or try to get users." - Billy Howell LCA helps Fortune 500s and fast-growing startups build their future - from Warner Music to Fortnite to Dropbox. We turn 'what if' into reality with AI, apps, and next-gen products https://latecheckout.agency/ BoringAds — ads agency that will build you profitable ad campaigns http://boringads.com/ BoringMarketing — SEO agency and tools to get your organic customers http://boringmarketing.com/ Startup Empire — a membership for builders who want to build cash-flowing businesses https://www.startupempire.co FIND ME ON SOCIAL X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/gregisenberg Instagram: https://instagram.com/gregisenberg/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/gisenberg/ FIND BILLY ON SOCIAL X/Twitter: https://x.com/billyjhowell Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@billyjhowell